frederic.chhum

Par frederic.chhum le 26/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 8 mois 4 semaines

Senior executives (cadres dirigeants), who are excluded from the provisions of French Labour Code relating to working time, rest and holidays, constitute a very restricted category of employees.

Article L. 3111-2 of French Labour Code defines senior executives (cadres dirigeants) as executives who are assigned responsibilities whose importance implies a great independence in the organization of their schedule (1), who are authorized to take decisions in a largely autonomous way (2) and who receive remuneration at the highest levels of the remuneration systems in their company (3).

The Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) specifies, by established case-law, that the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) supposes the participation of the employee in the management of the company.

Above all, it constantly ensures that this notion receives a restrictive application.

However, the consequences in the event of disqualification can be very costly for thecompany: the employee can then request the payment of all overtime if he/she can justify within the limit of three years.

2016 and the first half of 2017 have resulted in several judgments concerning senior executive status.

The purpose of this article is to provide a non-exhaustive overview of the judgments on this subject and the lessons to be drawn from them.

1) Criteria used by the Court of Cassation to admit / refuse the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant)

1.1) Cass. Soc. June 22nd 2016, n°14-29.246: the requirement to participate in the management of the company is not an independent criterion that would replace legal criteria

In a resounding judgment of 22nd June 2016 (n°14-29.246), to which the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) intended to give the widest publicity, the Court of Cassation affirmed that the judges of the merits (The french labour tribunal and Court of appeal) faced with a question concerning the validity of senior executives status, first had to check that the legal criteria were met and only then draw the conclusion that the employee actually participates in the management of the company.

This solution was then confirmed by a judgment of December 1st 2016 (n °15-24.695).

However, the requirement to participate in the company has not been abandoned by the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) which continues to apply (see in particular Cass Soc July 6th 2016, n°15-10.987).

It is now simply stated that this requirement does not constitute an independent criterion capable of replacing the three criteria of Article L. 3111-2 of French Labour Code.

This is a finding that must necessarily be made by the judges of the merits but only after having previously found the meeting of the legal criteria.

In no case can they be content to justify the application of the status of senior executive.

1.2) Cass. Soc. May 11th 2017, n° 15-27.118: the fact of intervening only at a decentralized level of the company does not prevent the recognition of the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant)

In a decision of May 11th 2017 (n°15-27118), the Court of cassation (Cour de cassation) for the first time to our knowledge, expressly stated that the exercise of its functions at a decentralized level was not incompatible with the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant).

He was in this case a Sector Manager (Chef de secteur) of a construction company.

He was responsible for two construction supervisors, a project manager and four site managers, who were in charge of the commercial and technical and financial management of the yards in his geographical area.

He had the power to conclude all contracts for public works or private works of an amount less than or equal to one million euros, subcontract all or part of these markets and generally represent the company both with regard to the owners and contractors that with regard to third parties, he had delegated powers to recruit and dismiss workers, to apply disciplinary sanctions, to take all necessary measures to comply with the regulations on social law, the awarding and execution of public or private contracts, regulations on hygiene and safety, the environment and the absence of nuisance.

Lastly, he participated in the management committees under the chairmanship of the regional director and out of a workforce of more than one thousand and one of twelve employees whose gross annual salary was between 50,000 and 100,000 euros, five others employees only receiving higher remuneration.

The Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) held that "the functions of the person concerned within the company, even at a decentralized level, were those of a senior executive (cadre dirigeant) to whom the rules relating to hours of work were not applicable" (Cass Soc.May 11th 2017, n°15-27118).

In doing so, the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) strongly rejected the argument that the exercise of limited functions at a decentralized level of the company would be incompatible with the status of senior executive.

2) 7 concrete situations in which the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) has been recognized or refused by the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation)

The Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) was also asked to rule on several cases in which the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) was challenged by the employee.

2.1) Cases in which the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) has been admitted by the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation)

The Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation), for example, recognized the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) with regard to:

• The Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Directeur Général délégué) of a catering company, member of the management committee, independent in the organization of his schedule, benefiting from one of the highest salaries of the company and empowered to make decisions in a widely autonomous.

In this respect, the Court states that it does not matter whether the employee's payslips mention 169 hours per month (Cass Soc July 6th 2016, n°15-10987);

• The Managing Director of a Russian company of the German Group GmbH whose remuneration was among the three highest in the group, whose job description showed that he had independence in the organization of his work and was entitled to as a proxyholder, to make decisions in a largely autonomous manner (Cass Soc Sept 28th 2016, n°15-10736);

• Auchan group store manager chaired the store management committee, which chaired the establishment committee and the CHSCT, and enjoyed a very wide delegation of authority in all sectors, including the management of the conclusion, execution and termination of employment contracts, participated in the definition of company policy and sat on the supervisory board, could incur expenses alone up to a limit of 100 000 euros and incur expenses up to 200 000 euros in agreement with the management controller, had complete independence in the organization of his schedule and received the highest remuneration of the store (Cass Soc March 8th 2017, n°15-24117);

2.2) Cases in which the status of senior executive (cadre dirigeant) has been refused by the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation)

On the other hand, the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) invalidated the status of senior executive with regard to:

• The Director of a car dealership for which it was not established that he had any of the most important remuneration of the company or that he participated in the management of it (Cass. Jan. 27th, 2016, n°13-26251);

• The head of the store department of a furniture brand on the sole ground that it did not participate in the company's strategy or in the management of the company (Cass Soc June 15th 2016, n ° 15- 12894);

• The director of an educational institution whose job description provided that he was responsible for ensuring the implementation of the establishment project approved by the association on the grounds that he did not have sufficient autonomy (Cass Soc Jan 11th 2017, n°14-21548).

2.3) Court of Appeal of Paris (Cour d’appel de Paris), May 23rd, 2017, n ° 14/10516: Refusal of the status of senior executive, reminder of overtime and judicial termination of the employment contract

In a judgment of May 23rd, 2017 (Court of Appeal Paris 6-3, n °14/10516, there is a “pourvoi” against this decision), the Court of Appeal of Paris refused the status of senior executive to a senior Stylist of an international luxury group.

In declaring the nullity of his executive status, the Court of Appeal (Cour d’appel) held in particular that:

• the stylist performed her duties according to the instructions of the artistic director and of the Studio coordinator and her other superiors and did not have the capacity to make autonomous decisions;

• the employer did not respond to the employee's summons to communicate the pay slips required to justify the remuneration actually received by other employees;

• the employee requested leave authorizations, her schedule of meetings was set taking into account the availability of the director general or other collaborators, her travel expenses were subject to prior authorization so that she would not did not enjoy a great deal of independence in organizing his schedule and his work.

As a result, the stylist obtained a substantial overtime reminder as well as damages for non-compliance with compensatory rest and damages for breach of weekly rest.

Finally, in addition to the moral harassment (harcèlement moral) of which the Stylist was a victim, the Court of Appeal (Cour d’appel) held that her status as a senior executive (cadre dirigeant) was null and void, as well as the failure to pay overtime in very significant proportions to consider that the judicial termination of the wrongs exclusivity of the employer was justified.

3) The indemnity to repair the loss of opportunity to raise options is taxable as a salary (Conseil d'Etat, May 22nd, 2017, N°395440)

In a judgment of May 22nd, 2017 (n°395440), the Council of State (Conseil d' Etat) ruled on the tax system of the compensation to repair the damage resulting from the loss of the possibility of raising stock options.

The Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) stated that the compensation for the loss of the right to exercise the stock options was not intended to make good the damage resulting from the dismissal without any real and serious cause.

Accordingly, this allowance is taxable as a salary and "as would have been the income from the exercise of the option if the executive had exercised its stock options" on the basis of Articles 79 and 82 of the French General Tax Code.

Frédéric CHHUM Avocat à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 22/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 2 jours

Source Légifrance :

décret n° 2017-1725 du 21 décembre 2017 relatif à la procédure de reclassement interne sur le territoire national en cas de licenciements pour motif économique

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=53BCFCCE8524BA828C0B9BF07D6B9C57.tplgfr41s_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000036245819&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000036244924

Le décret n° 2017-1725 du 21 décembre 2017 fixe les modalités relatives aux offres de reclassement interne sur le territoire national en cas de licenciement pour motif économique.

Ce décret entre en vigueur le 23 décembre 2017.

1) Offres de reclassement personnalisée ou liste des offres de reclassement disponibles

L'employeur qui envisage de procéder au licenciement pour motif économique d'un salarié, doit chercher au préalable des solutions de reclassement interne pour ce dernier.

Le décret précise les modalités selon lesquelles l'employeur remplit cette obligation, notamment les conditions dans lesquelles l'employeur adresse de manière personnalisée les offres de reclassement à chaque salarié ou diffuse par tout moyen une liste de l'ensemble des postes disponibles à l'ensemble des salariés.
 

Pour l'application de l'article L. 1233-4, l'employeur adresse des offres de reclassement de manière personnalisée ou communique la liste des offres disponibles aux salariés, et le cas échéant l'actualisation de celle-ci, par tout moyen permettant de conférer date certaine.
 

2) Offre de reclassement précise

Ces offres écrites précisent :
« a) L'intitulé du poste et son descriptif ;
« b) Le nom de l'employeur ;
« c) La nature du contrat de travail ;
« d) La localisation du poste ;
« e) Le niveau de rémunération ;
« f) La classification du poste.
 

3) Précisions en cas de diffusion d’une liste d’offres de reclassement disponibles

En cas de diffusion d'une liste des offres de reclassement interne, celle-ci comprend les postes disponibles situés sur le territoire national dans l'entreprise et les autres entreprises du groupe dont l'entreprise fait partie.

La liste précise les critères de départage entre salariés en cas de candidatures multiples sur un même poste, ainsi que le délai dont dispose le salarié pour présenter sa candidature écrite.

Ce délai ne peut être inférieur à quinze jours francs à compter de la publication de la liste, sauf lorsque l'entreprise fait l'objet d'un redressement ou d'une liquidation judiciaire.

Dans les entreprises en redressement ou liquidation judiciaire, ce délai ne peut être inférieur à quatre jours francs à compter de la publication de la liste.

L'absence de candidature écrite du salarié à l'issue du délai mentionné au deuxième alinéa vaut refus des offres.

Article D. 1233-2-1. nouveau du code du travail

 

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 21/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 3 jours

The process of denouncing harassment at work can be particularly difficult to undertake and the employees can fear for reprisals.

1) Definition of sexual and moral harassment (harcèlement sexuel et moral) according to French Labour Code

Before doing so, it is necessary to recall the way in which the Labour Code defines sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) and moral harassment (harcèlement moral) in order to precisely define its contours.

1.1) Definition of moral harassment (harcèlement moral) (article L.1152-1 C. trav.)

Moral harassment (harcèlement moral) is defined by Article L.1152-1 of French Labour Code.

These are repeated acts that have the purpose or effect a deterioration of working conditions that may affect the employee's rights and dignity, alter his or her physical or mental health, or could jeopardize her / his professional future.

Moral harassment can for example be humiliations, vexatious remarks, sidelining (mise à l’écart), anxiety-provoking management methods (méthodes de management anxiogènes), etc.

The repeated nature of the facts is a necessary condition for defining harassment.

1.2) Definition of sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) (article L. 1153-1 C. trav.) Article L.1153-1 of the Labour Code lays down a double definition of sexual harassment, which can take two forms:

Sexually-oriented remarks or behaviors (les propos ou comportements à connotation sexuelle) that either endanger the dignity of the victimized employee because of their degrading or humiliating nature, or create a situation that is intimidating, hostile or offensive; Any form of serious pressure, even if not repeated, exercised for the real or apparent purpose of obtaining an act of a sexual nature, whether it is sought for the benefit of the perpetrator or for the benefit of a third party. In a recent judgment of May 17,th 2017 (Cass Soc., May 17,th 2017, n ° 15-19300), the Court of Cassation abandoned the criterion of repetition of words or behaviors with sexual connotations and specified that a single fact can be sufficient to constitute a situation of sexual harassment.

(cf. Our Article:https://www.village-justice.com/articles/Salaries-cadres-fait-unique-peut-suffire-caracteriser-harcelement-sexuel-Cass,25225.html#7AGjzkKG0VCdbZXe.99).

The fact (s) may occur outside the place and time of work, since they are directly related to labour relations (Cass Soc., Oct, 19th 2011, N°. 09-72672).

For example, the case of an employee who receives sexual messages on his personal phone from one of his colleagues outside his working hours.

It is sufficient that the behavior or behaviors have a sexual connotation, which does not require that they have an explicit and directly sexual.

1.3) Sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) versus sexist behavior (comportement sexiste)

The law n° 2015-994 of August 17th 2015 introduced the definition of sexist activity: "No one shall be subjected to sexist acts, defined as any act related to the sex of a person, with the object of or for the purpose of impairing his or her dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment "(Article L.1142-2-1 of the Criminal Code).

Sexist activity is defined as any act related to the sex of a person, the object or effect of which is to undermine one's dignity or to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.

It is part of the provisions on professional equality between women and men in Title IV of French Labour Code.

The law n°2016-1088 of August 18th 2016 then added three provisions to make more effective the struggle against sexist acts.

(cf. Our Article: https://www.village-justice.com/articles/Salaries-cadres-les-nouveautes-Loi-Travail-matiere-agissements-sexistes,23545.html)

First, as part of its obligation to ensure the safety and mental health of employees, the employer must plan for prevention related to sexist behavior as well as for risks related to moral (harcèlement moral) and sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) (art. L.4121-2 French Labour Code).

In addition, the CHSCT can also propose actions to prevent sexist behavior.

If the employer refuses the actions proposed by the CHSCT, this refusal must be motivated (article L.4612-3 French Labour Code.)

Lastly, the company's internal regulations (règlement intérieur) must mention the provisions on the prohibition of sexist practices (article L.1321-2 French Labour Code).

1.4) Adjustment of the burden of proof of sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement sexuel ou moral)

Evidence of sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) is often provided by testimonials from people who have witnessed the offending remarks or behaviors.

However, it can be very difficult to obtain certificates from colleagues against their employer when they are still employed in the company.

However, whether it is sexual or moral harassment, the French Labour Code facilitates the employee's proof that he must provide evidence that could lead to the presumption of harassment.

It is then up to the employer to establish that the acts in question are extraneous to any harassment.

Otherwise, the harassment must be considered sufficiently established for the employee.

Nevertheless, in the absence of any evidence, the employee's request is doomed to fail.

However, it is often very complicated for the employee (s) victim of sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement sexuel et moral) to obtain any evidence proving the reality of its their denunciations.

It is by definition of words or behaviors that do not generally lead to the establishment of any writing.

2) Action before French Labour tribunal (Conseil de prud’hommes): a derogatory prescription

An employee who has been the victim of sexual or moral harassment may, in addition to reporting this situation to his employer, refer the matter to the Labour tribunal (Conseil de prud’hommes) within five years (section L.1471-1 (3) C. Work).

This action may have a twofold object, one of which relates to the awarding of damages and the other relating to the termination of the employment contract of the employee victim of harassment.

2.1) Need to report the harassment situation to its employer

Above all, the employee who suffers such acts, whether sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement sexuel ou moral), must imperatively report this situation to its employer.

Indeed, since a judgment of September 13th 2017 (Cass Soc., Sept. 13th 2017, N°15-23045), the Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) considers that, to benefit from the protection against dismissal applicable in case of moral harassment (harcèlement moral) (see below), the employee must necessarily have denounced the facts by qualifying them as such.

In addition, only the employer is obliged to take all the necessary measures to put an end to any situation of harassment. (L.1153-5 French Labour Code)

Such measures may include a change in hierarchical attachment of the harassed employee, the establishment of psychological monitoring and the initiation of a disciplinary procedure against the "harasser" which may lead to a penalty up to and including dismissal.

In addition, in the event of inaction by the employer following his denunciation, this will subsequently allow the victim employee to claim compensation for this inaction.

It may also be very useful to report this situation to the Labour Inspector (inspection du travail), which may conduct an independent inquiry and order the company to take the measures it deems necessary.

2.2) Sexual or Moral Harassment (harcèlement sexuel ou moral) and Termination of the Employment Contract: Exclusion from the scale of compensation for unfair dismissal or dissmissal declared void and null according to Macron Ordinance of September 27nd 2017

In addition to compensation for the resulting harm, sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement sexuel et moral) can have a direct impact on the employee's contract of employment.

On the one hand, an employee who denounces harassment is protected against dismissal (Artcile L.1152-3 and L.1153-4 French Labour Code).

The sole limit to this protection depends on the bad faith of the employee, which is understood not only because the facts complained of are not established but because of the falsehood of the denunciation.

Any dismissal action related to acts constituting harassment is null and void.

In this case, the employee whose dismissal is linked to a situation of harassment that he has suffered or refused to undergo has an option:

Either he requests his reinstatement within the company and the payment of the salaries he should have received between the date of his dismissal and that of his actual reinstatement;       Either he does not apply for reinstatement, in which case he is entitled, on the one hand, to severance pay and, on the other hand, to an indemnity for all the damage resulting from the unlawful nature of its dismissal, which cannot be less to six months salary.

In this respect, Macron Ordinances expressly exclude the application of the scale of severance pay applicable to the labour tribunal in the harassment hypotheses.

(cf.Our Article: https://www.village-justice.com/articles/salaries-cadres-cadres-dirigeants-conseils-pour-echapper-plafonnement-des,26172.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=RSS

It should be noted that it is the same for a mutually agreed termination (rupture conventionnelle) that would be signed in a context of harassment, the employee being in a situation of moral violence because of the harassment suffered at the time of signing (Cass Soc. Jan. 30th 2013, N°11-22332).

On the other hand, the employee who is the victim of sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement moral ou sexuel) who considers that this situation is an obstacle to the continuation of his employment contract, may request the judicial termination of his/her employment contract or take note of the breach.

If the facts of harassment are established, the judicial termination or the taking of an act will produce the effects of a null dismissal and the employee will benefit from the aforementioned option. (Cass Soc., Feb. 20th 2013, N°11-26560).

Lastly, an employee who has been the victim of sexual or moral harassment (harcèlement moral ou sexuel) may obtain compensation from the Industrial Tribunal for damages.

In this respect, the case law (see in particular the judgment of 17th May 2017 mentioned above) states that the employee may accumulate:

A claim for damages as a result of his employer's breach of his obligation of security of result (Article L. 1153-5 Labour code.); and A claim for damages for the physical and mental harm suffered as a result of sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) (Article L. 1153-1 French Labour Code)

The employee who is the victim of sexual harassment (harcèlement sexuel) is therefore entitled to make a double claim for compensation provided that it establishes the existence of two distinct harms, one for sexual harassment in itself (for example, moral prejudice linked to  humiliation suffered (préjudice moral lié à l’humiliation subie)) and the other linked to the employer's failure to fulfill the obligation of safety of result (for example, the sick leave that may have followed).

 

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 20/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 4 jours

Dans un communiqué du 18 décembre 2017, le barreau de Paris a communiqué la procédure de mise en état des dossiers devant le Conseil de prud’hommes de Nanterre.

1) Note explicative :

Lors du 1er Bureau de Conciliation et d’Orientation (BCO), le Conseil de Prud’hommes fixera un calendrier avec 6 dates (remise d’un bulletin):

·         4 dates de communication (demandeur + 2 mois / défendeur + 3 mois/ réplique + 1mois / duplique +1 mois) ;

·         1 date de 2ème  BCO et de clôture (+ 1 mois) ;

·         1 date de Bureau de Jugement (+ 1 mois).

Si la requête du demandeur est appréciée par le conseil et les avocats comme valant conclusions, la 1ère date (date de communication pour le demandeur) sera supprimée.

Les avocats devront informer le greffe par mail de la date de communication effective de leurs conclusions et pièces afin que le Conseil puisse avoir connaissance du bon suivi du calendrier fixé.

Lors du 2ème BCO (mise en état et clôture), si le demandeur n’est pas en état, l’affaire pourra être radiée.

La présence des avocats n’est pas requise au 2e BCO sauf difficulté.

2) RAPPEL des documents à remette lors de l’audience du bureau de Jugement

Il est par ailleurs rappelé que lors du BJ, les avocats doivent remettre :

·         5 exemplaires du Par Ces Motifs de leurs conclusions ;

·         Un dossier de plaidoirie (si possible sans cotes) contenant leurs conclusions, pièces dans l’ordre de numérotation non reliées, éventuelles jurisprudences.

Source : Barreau de Paris

http://www.avocatparis.org/conseil-de-prudhommes-de-nanterre

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

Par frederic.chhum le 19/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 5 jours

Maître Frédéric CHHUM est l’avocat du salarié.

Ce jugement du conseil de prud’hommes de Nanterre (CPH Nanterre, Encadrement 5/10/2017définitif) est intéressant car il tranche la question de savoir si une société peut plafonner unilatéralement la rémunération variable d’un ingénieur d’affaires.

Le jugement est définitif car les parties n'ont pas interjetté appel.

En savoir plus sur https://www.village-justice.com/articles/ingenieur-affaires-ibm-obtient-300-000-euros-bruts-aux-prud-hommes-pour-rappel,26745.html#gDajtuKITZDMIIuQ.99

 

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 15/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 1 semaine

Cet arrêt de la Cour de cassation est important.

Dans cet arrêt, la Cour de cassation casse l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris qui avait validé le licenciement d’une salariée pour avoir refusé d'ôter son foulard islamique lorsqu'elle intervenait dans des entreprises clientes de la société.

Il faut noter les circonstances particulières de l’espèce :

aucune clause de neutralité interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail n'était prévue dans le règlement intérieur de l'entreprise ou dans une note de service soumise aux mêmes dispositions que le règlement intérieur en application de l'article L. 1321-5 du code du travail et l'interdiction faite à la salariée de porter le foulard islamique dans ses contacts avec les clients résultait seulement d'un ordre oral donné à une salariée et visant un signe religieux déterminé.

Selon nous, la solution aurait été différente sur le règlement intérieur de l’entreprise concernée avait prévu une clause de neutralité interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail.

 

1) Restrictions à la liberté religieuse doivent être justifiées par la nature de la tâche à accomplir, répondre à une exigence professionnelle essentielle et déterminante et proportionnées au but recherché

La Cour de cassation rappelle que « Les restrictions à la liberté religieuse doivent être justifiées par la nature de la tâche à accomplir, répondre à une exigence professionnelle essentielle et déterminante et proportionnées au but recherché ; qu'aux termes de l'article L. 1321-3, 2°, du code du travail, le règlement intérieur ne peut contenir des dispositions apportant aux droits des personnes et aux libertés individuelles et collectives des restrictions qui ne seraient pas justifiées par la nature de la tâche à accomplir ni proportionnées au but recherché ».

2) Saisine par la Cour de Cassation d’une question préjudicielle de la CJUE

Saisie par la Cour de cassation dans le présent pourvoi d'une question préjudicielle, la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, par arrêt du 14 mars 2017 (CJUE, Asma X..., aff. C-188/15), a dit pour droit :

"L'article 4, paragraphe 1, de la directive 2000/78/CE du Conseil, du 27 novembre 2000, portant création d'un cadre général en faveur de l'égalité de traitement en matière d'emploi et de travail, doit être interprété en ce sens que la volonté d'un employeur de tenir compte des souhaits d'un client de ne plus voir les services dudit employeur assurés par une travailleuse portant un foulard islamique ne saurait être considérée comme une exigence professionnelle essentielle et déterminante au sens de cette disposition" ;

Par arrêt du même jour (CJUE, 14 mars 2017, G4S Secure Solutions, C-157/15), la Cour de justice a dit pour droit : "L'article 2, paragraphe 2, sous a), de la directive 2000/78/CE du Conseil, du 27 novembre 2000, portant création d'un cadre général en faveur de l'égalité de traitement en matière d'emploi et de travail, doit être interprété en ce sens que l'interdiction de porter un foulard islamique, qui découle d'une règle interne d'une entreprise privée interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail, ne constitue pas une discrimination directe fondée sur la religion ou sur les convictions au sens de cette directive ; qu'en revanche, une telle règle interne d'une entreprise privée est susceptible de constituer une discrimination indirecte au sens de l'article 2, paragraphe 2, sous b), de la directive 2000/78/CE s'il est établi que l'obligation en apparence neutre qu'elle prévoit entraîne, en fait, un désavantage particulier pour les personnes adhérant à une religion ou à des convictions données, à moins qu'elle ne soit objectivement justifiée par un objectif légitime, tel que la poursuite par l'employeur, dans ses relations avec ses clients, d'une politique de neutralité politique, philosophique ainsi que religieuse, et que les moyens de réaliser cet objectif ne soient appropriés et nécessaires, ce qu'il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier" ;

La Cour de justice a précisé, dans les motifs de cette dernière décision (§ 43), s'agissant du refus d'une salariée de renoncer au port du foulard islamique dans l'exercice de ses activités professionnelles auprès de clients de l'employeur, qu'il appartient à la juridiction nationale de vérifier si, tout en tenant compte des contraintes inhérentes à l'entreprise, et sans que celle-ci ait à subir une charge supplémentaire, il eût été possible à l'employeur, face à un tel refus, de lui proposer un poste de travail n'impliquant pas de contact visuel avec ces clients, plutôt que de procéder à son licenciement.
3) L'employeur est investi de la mission de faire respecter au sein de la communauté de travail l'ensemble des libertés et droits fondamentaux de chaque salarié peut prévoir dans le règlement intérieur de l'entreprise ou dans une note de service soumise aux mêmes dispositions que le règlement intérieur, en application de l'article L. 1321-5 du code du travail, une clause de neutralité interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail

L'employeur, investi de la mission de faire respecter au sein de la communauté de travail l'ensemble des libertés et droits fondamentaux de chaque salarié, peut prévoir dans le règlement intérieur de l'entreprise ou dans une note de service soumise aux mêmes dispositions que le règlement intérieur, en application de l'article L. 1321-5 du code du travail, une clause de neutralité interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail, dès lors que cette clause générale et indifférenciée n'est appliquée qu'aux salariés se trouvant en contact avec les clients.

En présence du refus d'une salariée de se conformer à une telle clause dans l'exercice de ses activités professionnelles auprès des clients de l'entreprise, il appartient à l'employeur de rechercher si, tout en tenant compte des contraintes inhérentes à l'entreprise et sans que celle-ci ait à subir une charge supplémentaire, il lui est possible de proposer à la salariée un poste de travail n'impliquant pas de contact visuel avec ces clients, plutôt que de procéder à son licenciement.
 

4) Le cas d’espèce : salariée licenciée pour faute pour avoir refusé d'ôter son foulard islamique lorsqu'elle intervenait dans des entreprises clientes de la société = licenciement discriminatoire fondée sur les convictions religieuses

Madame X a été engagée à compter du 15 juillet 2008 par contrat de travail à durée indéterminée par la société Micropole univers, société de conseil, d'ingénierie et de formation spécialisée dans le développement et l'intégration de solutions décisionnelles, en qualité d'ingénieur d'études.

Elle a été convoquée à un entretien préalable à un éventuel licenciement le 15 juin 2009 et licenciée par lettre du 22 juin 2009 pour faute pour avoir refusé d'ôter son foulard islamique lorsqu'elle intervenait dans des entreprises clientes de la société.

La salariée a saisi le 10 novembre 2009 la juridiction prud'homale en contestant son licenciement et en faisant valoir qu'il constituait une mesure discriminatoire en raison de ses convictions religieuses.
 

La Cour d’appel de Paris a considéré que le licenciement de la salariée était fondé sur une cause réelle et sérieuse en raison des éléments suivants :

une entreprise doit tenir compte de la diversité des clients et de leurs convictions et qu'elle est donc naturellement amenée à imposer aux employés qu'elle envoie au contact de sa clientèle une obligation de discrétion qui respecte les convictions de chacun, à la condition toutefois que la restriction qui en résulte soit justifiée par la nature de la tâche à effectuer et proportionnée au but recherché, qu'en l'espèce, il est établi qu'une société cliente a souhaité que les interventions de la salariée se fassent désormais sans port de voile afin de ne pas gêner certains de ses collaborateurs, que la restriction que l'employeur a alors imposée à la liberté de la salariée de manifester ses convictions religieuses par sa tenue vestimentaire a été proportionnée au but recherché puisque seulement limitée aux contacts avec la clientèle, les travaux effectués dans ses locaux par un ingénieur d'études portant un voile ne lui créant aucune difficulté selon ses propres déclarations, qu'ainsi, il apparaît que le licenciement ne procède pas d'une discrimination tenant à ses convictions religieuses puisque la salariée était autorisée à continuer à les exprimer au sein de l'entreprise mais qu'il est justifié par une restriction légitime procédant des intérêts de l'entreprise alors que la liberté donnée à la salariée de manifester ses convictions religieuses débordait le périmètre de l'entreprise et empiétait sur les sensibilités de ses clients et donc sur les droits d'autrui.

Dans son arrêt du 21 novembre 2017, la Cour de cassation casse l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris.

La Cour de cassation relève que :

qu'aucune clause de neutralité interdisant le port visible de tout signe politique, philosophique ou religieux sur le lieu de travail n'était prévue dans le règlement intérieur de l'entreprise ou dans une note de service soumise aux mêmes dispositions que le règlement intérieur en application de l'article L. 1321-5 du code du travail et que l'interdiction faite à la salariée de porter le foulard islamique dans ses contacts avec les clients résultait seulement d'un ordre oral donné à une salariée et visant un signe religieux déterminé, ce dont il résultait l'existence d'une discrimination directement fondée sur les convictions religieuses, et alors qu'il résulte de l'arrêt de la Cour de justice en réponse à la question préjudicielle posée que la volonté d'un employeur de tenir compte des souhaits d'un client de ne plus voir les services dudit employeur assurés par une salariée portant un foulard islamique ne saurait être considérée comme une exigence professionnelle essentielle et déterminante au sens de l'article 4, paragraphe 1, de la directive du 27 novembre 2000, la cour d'appel a méconnu la portée des textes susvisés.

L’affaire est renvoyée devant la Cour d’appel de Paris autrement composée.

Source légifrance

Cass soc 22 novembre 2017, n° 13-19855

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000036089997&fastReqId=1170205165&fastPos=1

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 15/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 1 semaine

Macron Ordinance N°. 2017-1387 of September 22nd, 2017 on the predictability and securing of employment relationship, provides for a capping on compensation for unfair dismissal with a minimum scale (Barème minimum) and a maximum scal (Barème maximum).

In our brief of September 5th, 2017 titled "What Changes for employees with Capping of compensation for unfair dismissal", we analyzed the changes to the ceilings on the severance pay system.

https://www.legavox.fr/blog/frederic-chhum-avocats/macron-ordinances-wha...

The capping (plafonnement) of the Macron ordinance will inevitably weaken and contributed to the precarious of employees in companies because compensation for unfair dismissal will be priced and it will no longer be dissuasive, especially for employees under 5 years seniority.

Take for example an employee who has 2 years’seniority in a company with more than 10 employees and whose dismissal is without cause (unfair dismissal). Whereas previously, this employee would have obtained a minimum compensation of 6 months of gross salary to labour courts, the dismissal compensation planned by the Macron Ordinances is now fixed at 3.5 months of salary, that is almost two times less. Now take an employee who has 5 years’seniority in a company with more than 10 employees, he can now obtain, a maximum compensation of 6 months salary in case of unfair dismissal but will also be applied the minimum amount of 3 months' salary provided for in the scale. Finally, take an employee who has 10 years’seniority in a company with more than 10 employees, he can obtain in the event of unfair dismissal, a compensation varying between the minimum amount of 3 months and a ceiling of 10 months salary.

Having said that of these new rules, the purpose of this article is to present four simple tips to avoid the ceiling of the Macron ordinance and to secure your employment contract.

1) Tip n° 1: Negotiate a "golden parachute" in your employment contract and / or negociate longer contractual notice period

To negotiate a "golden parachute" is THE Council (almost) unstoppable

In practice, this advice is however intended for executives (cadres supérieurs) or senior managers (cadres dirigeants) who are most often granted such clauses.

However, any employee may attempt to negotiate a "golden parachute" with his new employer or current employer.

The "golden parachute" or contractual compensation allows to avoid the Macron scale (Barème) provided for by ordinances.

It consists in providing, in advance and contractually, the amount of compensation that will be due in the event of dismissal instead of legal or contractual compensation.

This contractual compensation is in addition to the possible compensation for unfair dismissal of Macron ordinances.

It can be negotiated freely and therefore be much higher than the scale.

However, it should be noted that these "golden parachutes" are penal clauses (clauses pénales) and as such, the compensation provided can be reduced to court, if the judge considers them excessive.

Even if today, this kind of clause is rather reserved for the executives, any employee whose know-how is sought, as it is dismissed by his employer, can negotiate a "golden parachute" in order to avoid the Macron scale and thus dissuade his employer from dismissing him.

Example of "golden parachute" clause to insert in your employment contract: "In the event of dismissal or termination of the employment contract at the initiative of the employer, the employee will receive a contractual dismissal compensation of 6 or [12] or [18] or [24] months of gross salary which adds to the conventional dismissal compensation of the collective agreement applicable to the contract. "

Another possibility to increase the compensation due in the event of a break-up is the negotiation of a longer contractual notice (préavis) than that provided by the applicable collective agreement or the law.

Longer contractual notice (préavis contractuel) (for example 6 months, 9 months, 12 months) ensures that the employee's remuneration is maintained during this period in order to amortize his dismissal and, if necessary, to seek a new job more peacefully.

2) Tip n ° 2: Plead to the labor courts that you are in one of the 8 cases of exclusion of capping provided for by Article L. 1235-3-1 of the french Labour Code.

Cases of exclusion from the capping of compensation for dismissal without real and serious cause are expressly provided for in Article L. 1235-3-1 of the Labour Code (art.2 ord n ​​° 2017-1387 of  September 22nd, 2017).

In this respect, Article L. 1235-3 is not applicable when the judge finds that the dismissal is tainted with one of the 8 nullities provided for in the second paragraph of Article L. 1235-3-1 of the Labour Code.

The "nullities" (nullités) are those relating to the violation of a fundamental freedom (violation d’une liberté fondamentale), to acts of moral or sexual harassment(harcèlement moral ou sexuel) under the conditions mentioned in Articles L. 1152-3 and L. 1153-4, to a discriminatory dismissal under the conditions provided for Articles L. 1134-4 and L. 1132-4 or following an action in court, for gender equality at the workplace under the conditions mentioned in Article L. 1144-3 and in case of denunciation of crimes or misdemeanors, or the exercise of a mandate by a protected employee mentioned in chapter I of title I of book IV of the second part, as well as to the protections of certain employees in application of articles L. 1225-71 and L. 1226-13.

In these cases, when the employee does not request the continuation of his employment contract or his reinstatement is impossible, the judge awards him an indemnity, paid by the employer, which cannot be less than the wages last six months (no matter the size of the company).

The indemnity is then payable without prejudice to the payment of the salary, which would have been collected during the period covered by the invalidity when it is due pursuant to the provisions of Article L. 1225-71 and the protective status and, where appropriate, legal, contractual or conventional compensation.

Case 1: Nullity related to the violation of a fundamental freedom (liberté fondamentale)

The Macron scale (Barème Macron) will be rejected as soon as such dismissal is pronounced in violation of a fundamental freedom.

This would be the case, for example, of a dismissal based on the exercise by the employee of his right to strike.

Case 2: Nullity related to acts of moral or sexual harassment (harcèlement moral ou sexuel) under the conditions mentioned in Articles L. 1152-3 and L. 1153-4

Capping on compensation will also not apply each time the dismissal of the employee is made in a context of moral or sexual harassment.

However, the courts are (and probably will be) very strict in the assessment of moral or sexual harassment or violation of a fundamental freedom.

Case 3: Nullity relating to a discriminatory dismissal (licenciement discriminatoire) under the conditions provided for in Articles L. 1134-4 and L. 1132-4

Similarly, no capping will apply to dismissals that are discriminatory, that is to say, pronounced because of the origin of the employee, his sex, his morals, his sexual orientation, his gender identity, age, family status or pregnancy, genetic characteristics, particular vulnerability resulting from economic status, apparent or known to the perpetrator, belonging or non-belonging, true or assumed , an ethnic group, a nation or an alleged race, its political opinions, its trade union or mutual activities, its religious beliefs, its physical appearance, its surname, its place of residence or its bank domiciliation or because of his state of health, loss of autonomy or disability, ability to express himself in a language other than French.

Case 4: Nullity of dismissal following a lawsuit

The employee who is dismissed consecutively to the exercise of a legal action to assert his rights will not be able to be opposed against the scale provided by the ordinances.

Case 5: Nullity of a discriminatory dismissal in the matter of professional gender equality under the conditions mentioned in Article L. 1144-3 of French Labour Code

In the same way, the scale will be rejected in the case of a dismissal following a legal action taken by the employee on the basis of provisions relating to professional gender equality.

Case 6: Nullity of dismissal in case of denunciation of crimes and misdemeanors

An employee who has been dismissed as a result of his denunciation of crimes or misdemeanors of which he is aware, cannot be opposed to the scale of Macron ordinances.

This is particularly the case of employees whistleblowers who would be sanctioned following the denunciation of the practices of their employer.

Case 7: Nullity of dismissal linked to the exercise of a mandate by a protected employee (salarié protégé) mentioned in Chapter I of Title I of Book IV of Part Two (see "Tip 4") Case 8: Nullity related to a dismissal because related to the protections of certain employees in application of articles L. 1225-71 (dismissal related to the state of pregnancy) and L. 1226-13 (accident at work or illness)

Finally, dismissal in breach of special protection such as protection against dismissal in case of pregnancy or accident at work or occupational disease will avoid the ceiling.

3) Tip n° 3: Make claims to labour courts other than a claim for compensation for the prejudice caused by your unfair dismissal: ex: request for overtime payment, allowance for covert work (travail dissimulé), damages for moral harassment, recall bonus, salary reminder related to unequal treatment, etc.

Example 1: Requests for overtime (heures supplémentaires) and covert work (travail dissimulé)

Overtime claims are not included in capping provided by Macron Ordinances.

For employees whose working time is determined on the basis of a certain number of days (forfait jours), it is possible to ask for the cancellation of the working time organization if there is no control of the workload (charge de travail) related to this organization; in this case, the employee can obtain payment of his/her overtime within the limit of the prescription, provided he can prove it.

Similarly, a salaried executive who does not fulfill the 4 legal conditions relating to this status (ie: autonomy, great responsibility, salary among the highest of the company and belonging to the management of the company) may request nullity of this status and get the payment of his overtime (heures supplémentaires) if he can prove it (proof by an agenda with the start and end time each day, emails sent early in the morning and late at night etc.).

Example 2: Request a bonus

A bonus request may also be added to dismissal requests. An employee may request a bonus if the targets assigned to him/her are unrealistic and not reasonable, or if they were not brought to his attention at the beginning.

In such a case, the employee is entitled to claim 100% of the bonus he could have claimed if he had achieved all of his objectives. Again, no capping applies.

Example 3: Claim for damages for harassment (harcèlement moral ou sexuel)

Likewise, the employee who demonstrates that he is in a situation of harassment, whether moral or sexual, is entitled to claim damages to the Labour Court for the damages suffered.

To do this, the employee must provide elements likely to suggest the existence of a situation of harassment.

In this case, the damages may be cumulated with the dismissal compensation without capping limit.

Example 4: Salary reminder related to unequal treatment

The employee may also make a request for salary reminder based on unequal treatment, as long as he demonstrates that he received a lower salary than his colleagues in the same position with equivalent qualifications and seniority.

Once again, no cap applies to such a request.

4) Tip n°4: Get a union mandate (représentant syndical), a staff delegate (délégué du personnel) or a workers council member (membre du comité d’entreprise) to make it harder to fire

A warrant is the best way to deter your employer from firing you.

Your employer may reproach you for "instrumentalizing your mandate" but he will not be able to do anything except to challenge your election or appointment to the Court (Tribunal d’instance).

Protected employees (union mandate or staff representative) cannot be dismissed without authorization from the labor inspectorate (Inspection du travail).

However, labor inspectors are reluctant and very strict to grant the authorization of dismissal of a protected employee.

An employee who warrants a mandate will therefore be in practice better protected against dismissal.

He will also be better compensated if he is dismissed without authorization since, if necessary, his dismissal will be void and he will be able to apply for reinstatement and an eviction indemnity corresponding to the wages he should have received between the date of his dismissal and the expiry of the period of protection.

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

 

Par frederic.chhum le 12/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 1 semaine

Article 6 bis of the draft law authorizing the ratification of Macron ordinances issued on the Law n°2017-1340 of September 15th, 2017 amends the Monetary and Financial Code and the conditions of remuneration and compensation in case of dismissal of Traders (risk takers of credit institutions, portfolio management companies and investment firms).

This draft law was adopted by the French National Assembly on November 28th, 2017.

With these provisions, French Government wants to make the business center of Paris more attractive, particularly in order to attract English companies, following the Brexit, so that they settle in France.

1) Possibility for banks to recover "in whole or in part" the deferred bonuses (bonus différés) received by traders based on their actions or their behavior (Monetary and Financial Code Article L. 511-84-1 new)

Article 6 bis of the law of ratification makes effective the possibility, already granted by the Monetary and Financial Code, to credit institutions, portfolio management companies and other investment firms, to recover deferred bonuses from traders ("Risk-taking executive employee" (cadres preneurs de risques)).

In this regard, the draft law of ratification provides that the prohibition of financial penalties provided for in Article L. 1331-2 of the Labour Code does not apply to the variable remuneration of traders.

It should be noted that there is a principle which strictly prohibits the employer from making any form of deduction from the employee's remuneration as a penalty (Labour Code L.1331-2).

The text adds that this variable compensation may be reduced or give rise to restitution depending on the actions or behavior of the person.

In this regard, Article 6 bis 3° of the draft law ratifying Macron Ordinances provides that "(...) Notwithstanding Article L. 1331-2 of the Labor Code, the total amount of the variable remuneration may be reduced or give rise to restitution in particular according to the behavior of the person concerned in terms of risk taking "(Monetary and Financial Code Article L. 533-22-2 IV).

The "deferred" or "recoverable" bonuses are bonuses whose payment is conditional on performance criteria spread over time.

The objective is to limit certain risks by introducing an incentive factor for the sustainability of the projected operations.

On the other hand, if long-term performance is not achieved, a "clawback" clause may apply and the bonus may be lowered or refunded (in whole or in part) to the employer.

2) Exclusion of deferred bonuses from the calculation of severance pay and compensation for unfair dismissal (Monetary and Financial Code Art L. L. 533-22-2-1 new)

Article 6 bis of the draft law of ratification provides that these same bonuses shall not enter into the basis of calculation of the legal indemnity for dismissal or in the compensation for unfair dismissal.

In this regard, Article 6 bis 2 ° of the draft law ratifying Macron ordinances provides that: "- For the application of Articles L. 1226-15, L. 1234-9, L. 1235-3, L. 1235-3-1, L. 1235-11 and L. 1235-16 of the Labor Code, the determination of the compensation paid by the employer does not take into account, for risk-takers (...), the portion of the variable remuneration whose payment may be reduced or give rise to restitution pursuant to Articles L. 511-71 and L. 511-84 of this Code. "(Monetary and Financial Code Article L. 511-84-1 new).

2.1) Exclusion of deferred bonuses from the conventional severance pay

Deferred bonuses are not taken into account in the conventional severance pay (indemnité conventionnelle de licenciement) referred to in Article L. 1234-9 of the Labor Code.

Some consider that this article will however have little consequence.

Indeed, the two collective agreements (Collective Agreement IDCC Bank 2120 and Collective Agreement on Financial Markets IDCC 2931) applicable to traders already provide that the basis of severance pay only takes into account the fixed salary.

2.2) Exclusion of deferred bonuses from the compensation for unfair dismissal

Deferred bonuses are not taken into account in the compensation referred to in Articles L.1235-3 and L.1235-3-1 of the Labor Code.

This compensation for unfair dismissal is now subject to compulsory scale (what changes for the employees with the capping of compensation for unfair dismissal).

This mandatory scale is excluded in 8 cases (Labor Code L.1235-3-1), particularly in case of moral harassment (harcèlement moral) for breach of a fundamental obligation (violation d’une liberté fondamentale), etc. (cf Our article: Employees, executives, managers : 4 tips to avoid the ceiling of the industrial tribunal awards provided by the Macron Ordinance)

The impact of this exclusion on the amount of compensation for unjustified dismissal granted by the judge in the context of unfair dismissal, is major since the reference salary used as a basis for the calculation took up to present account the totality of the variable remuneration of the trader unjustly dismissed.

It should be noted that in principle the bonus cannot exceed the amount of the trader's fixed remuneration.

However, a decision of the general meeting of the credit institution or finance company may decide to increase the amount of the bonus to twice the fixed remuneration. (Monetary and Financial Code L.511-78)

3) Is this draft law contrary to the Constitution?

We can question the constitutionality of this draft law.

Do these provisions, in that they place traders in a situation different from that of other employees, not contrary to the constitutional principle of equality before the law (Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen)?

How can the legislator justify that only traders' bonuses will not be taken into account in the calculation of compensation for unfair dismissal?

One thinks in fact of employees who hold commercial jobs and whose variable remuneration can also be very substantial.

Can the legislator then avail himself of a general interest reason not to include the deferred bonuses of traders in compensation for unjustified dismissal? This remains to be demonstrated

In conclusion, with these provisions, the Government wants to make the financial center of Paris more attractive.

To dismiss a trader will be cheaper for banks to invest in France.

This is the curious and cynical message that the French Government is today sending to foreign investors.

Frédéric CHHUM

Avocats à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

 

Par frederic.chhum le 04/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 2 semaines

L’article 6 bis du projet de loi d’habilitation de ratification des ordonnances Macron prises sur le fondement de la loi n°2017-1340 du 15 septembre 2017 modifie le Code monétaire et financier et les conditions de rémunération et d’indemnisation en cas de licenciement des Traders (preneurs de risques des établissements de crédit, des sociétés de gestion de portefeuille et des entreprises d’investissement).

Ce projet de loi a été adopté par l’Assemblée Nationale le 28 novembre 2017. Avec ces dispositions, le Gouvernement veut rendre plus attractive la place financière de Paris, notamment afin d’attirer les entreprises anglaises, suite au Brexit, pour qu’elles s’installent en France.

En savoir plus sur https://www.village-justice.com/articles/bonus-differes-des-traders-qui-change-avec-les-ordonnances-macron-realisme,26627.html#IxJSEuymxtL1Ko6X.99

 

Frédéric CHHUM Avocat à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

. Paris : 4 rue Bayard 75008 Paris - Tel: 01 42 56 03 00 ou 01 42 89 24 48
. Nantes : 41, Quai de la Fosse 44000 Nantes -  Tel: 02 28 44 26 44

e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

Blog : www.chhum-avocats.fr

http://twitter.com/#!/fchhum

Par frederic.chhum le 04/12/17
Dernier commentaire ajouté il y a 9 mois 2 semaines

Madame X, engagée le 22 mars 2004 par la société Ernst & Young en qualité d'assistante, a obtenu le statut cadre le 1er octobre 2005.

Ayant prêté le serment d'avocat fin 2007, elle est devenue avocat salarié.

Après avoir pris acte de la rupture de son contrat de travail le 23 juillet 2012, elle a saisi le bâtonnier de l'ordre des avocats de Lille de demandes en paiement de différentes sommes au titre de la rupture, d'une discrimination et d'un rappel d'heures supplémentaires.

Dans un arrêt du 8 novembre 2017 (n°15-22758) de la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation, cette dernière a considéré que la convention de forfait jours de l’avocate était privée d’effet au visa de l’alinéa 11 du préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946, l'article 151 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne se référant à la Charte sociale européenne et à la Charte communautaire des droits sociaux fondamentaux des travailleurs, l'article L. 3121-45 du code du travail dans sa rédaction alors applicable, interprété à la lumière de l'article 17, §§ 1 et 4, de la directive 93/104/CE du Conseil du 23 novembre 1993, des articles 17, § 1, et 19 de la directive 2003/88/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 4 novembre 2003 et de l'article 31 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne.

La Cour de cassation rappelle que « le droit à la santé et au repos est au nombre des exigences constitutionnelles ».

Elle ajoute « qu'il résulte des articles susvisés des directives de l'Union européenne que les Etats membres ne peuvent déroger aux dispositions relatives à la durée du temps de travail que dans le respect des principes généraux de la protection de la sécurité et de la santé du travailleur ».

Elle affirme enfin, que « toute convention de forfait en jours doit être prévue par un accord collectif dont les stipulations assurent la garantie du respect de durées raisonnables de travail ainsi que des repos, journaliers et hebdomadaires ».

Elle constate que dans son arrêt du 1er juin 2015, la Cour d’appel de Douai a débouté l’avocate de sa demande d’heure supplémentaire aux motifs :

- que l'avenant du 26 octobre 2005 à son contrat de travail stipule une convention de forfait en jours,

- que les avocats salariés sont soumis à une convention collective dont un avenant prévoit le dispositif du forfait jour avec des garanties dont les parties conviennent qu'elles sont insuffisantes ;

- que toutefois la société a conclu un accord d'entreprise le 14 mai 2007 qui précise les modalités d'organisation du temps de travail et son décompte,

- qu'il indique l'obligation d'un suivi de la durée individuelle du travail dans un cadre annuel et rappelle les règles applicables en matière de congés annuels ainsi que celles relatives aux repos, que ces éléments permettent de valider la convention de forfait jour et que la salariée n'apporte aucun élément de nature à établir un manquement de l'employeur aux dispositions conventionnelles.

La Cour de cassation casse l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Douai.

Elle indique que

ni les dispositions de l'avenant n° 7 du 7 avril 2000 relatif à la réduction du temps de travail, alors applicable, à la convention collective des avocats salariés (cabinets d'avocats) du 17 février 1995, qui, dans le cas de forfaits en jours, se limitaient à prévoir, en premier lieu, que le nombre de journées ou demi-journées de travail sera comptabilisé sur un document établi à la fin de l'année par l'avocat concerné et précisant le nombre de journées ou de demi-journées de repos pris, en second lieu, qu'il appartient aux salariés concernés de respecter les dispositions impératives ayant trait au repos quotidien et au repos hebdomadaire, le cabinet devant veiller au respect de ces obligations, ni les stipulations de l'accord d'entreprise relatif à l'organisation du temps de travail du 14 mai 2007 qui se bornent à prévoir qu'un suivi du temps de travail sera effectué pour tout collaborateur sur une base annuelle, que toutefois, autant que faire se peut, la direction cherchera à faire un point chaque trimestre et à attirer l'attention des collaborateurs dont le suivi présente un solde créditeur ou débiteur trop important afin qu'ils fassent en sorte de régulariser la situation au cours du trimestre suivant, ne sont, en ne permettant pas à l'employeur de remédier en temps utile à une charge de travail éventuellement incompatible avec une durée raisonnable, de nature à garantir que l'amplitude et la charge de travail restent raisonnables et assurent une bonne répartition, dans le temps, du travail de l'intéressé, ce dont elle aurait dû déduire que la convention de forfait en jours était nulle, la cour d'appel a violé les textes susvisés.

L’affaire est renvoyée devant la Cour d’appel d’Amiens pour statuer sur les heures supplémentaires.

Cette nullité de la convention de forfait jours de l’avocate pourrait inciter les avocats salariés (même si ils sont peu nombreux par rapport aux avocats libéraux) à réclamer le paiement de leurs heures supplémentaires.

Cass. soc. 8 nov 2017, n°15-22758

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000036003561&fastReqId=1906894738&fastPos=1

Frédéric CHHUM Avocat à la Cour (Paris et Nantes)

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e-mail : chhum@chhum-avocats.com

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